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HOW TO SIDESTEP SAYING “SEE YA REAL 
SOON” TO THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: USING 
DROIT D’AUTEUR TO JUSTIFY A 
TRADEMARK-FAVORED TREATMENT  
OF MICKEY MOUSE 
LAURA JACOBS* 
Abstract: Mickey Mouse is one of the most recognizable characters in the 
world, but this famous character will be passing into the public domain 
when his copyright expires in 2024. The Walt Disney Company also has 
registered Mickey Mouse as a trademark. Thus, when Mickey passes into 
the public domain, an interesting conflict between copyright and trade-
mark law will arise, and it is unclear which area of intellectual property 
law should determine the protections, if any, afforded to Mickey. France’s 
droit d’auteur, or “author’s rights,” offers a possible solution: when an 
author’s exploitation rights expire, the author’s moral rights continue to 
exist indefinitely, protecting the author from potential harmful uses of his 
or her creation. This scheme is similar to the way trademark law contin-
ues to protect trademarks so long as they are used in commerce. By mar-
rying the concepts, trademark law would have a basis to supersede copy-
right’s public domain. Although there would be restrictions to prevent 
goodwill-damaging uses, the various trademark defenses would remain 
available to public domain users. Thus, allowing trademark law to govern 
in the public domain would encourage derivative works and thriving crea-
tivity while still protecting goodwill for generations to come. 
INTRODUCTION 
“I only hope we never lose sight of one thing—that it was all started by a 
mouse.”1 It is hard not to affiliate the Walt Disney Company (TWDC), a multi-
billion dollar corporation, with its iconic symbol, Mickey Mouse.2 Neverthe-
                                                                                                                           
 * Laura Jacobs is Managing Editor of the Boston College International & Comparative Law 
Review. 
 1 Laurie Ulster, Happy Birthday, Mickey Mouse! A Look at the Mouse That Built an Empire, BIO 
(Nov. 18, 2014), http://www.biography.com/news/mickey-mouse-history [https://perma.cc/XX89-
QFCN] (quoting Walt Disney). 
 2 See Joseph P. Liu, The New Public Domain, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1395, 1429–33; Could Os-
wald the Lucky Rabbit Have Been Bigger Than Mickey?, BBC (Dec. 3, 2012, 5:21 PM), http://
www.bbc.com/news/magazine-19910825 [https://perma.cc/8QM9-PU77] [hereinafter Oswald, BBC]; 
Disney Stock Information, WALT DISNEY CO., http://thewaltdisneycompany.com/investors/disney-
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less, we may be forced to do just that in 2024 when Mickey’s copyright expires 
and the character passes into the public domain.3 Once this occurs, anyone will 
be free to use the original image of Mickey Mouse in movies, merchandise, 
novels, and other media without legal repercussions.4 But is this the right re-
sult? Under U.S. copyright law, works produced before 1978 are protected for 
a term of ninety-five years; once that period has expired, a work passes into the 
public domain, making it available for anyone to use.5 This concept of limited 
protection has deep roots: it is enshrined in the Copyright Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which guarantees creators protection of their works but only for 
“limited Times.”6 
Nearly all countries employ some form of copyright protection, but many 
recognize these rights in different ways.7 France’s legal principle of droit 
d’auteur, for example, gives a creator perpetual protection of his or her 
work—a right derived from the belief that the creator’s own personality is both 
embedded in and expressed through his or her work.8 The concept of droit 
d’auteur bears similarities to both domestic and international trademark law in 
that it recognizes potentially perpetual rights to trademarked symbols.9 As long 
as the trademarked symbol is used to identify the source of a work or good, it 
is protected against uses that could cause consumer confusion or dilute the 
reputation of the symbol.10 This element of trademark doctrine has striking 
similarities to France’s droit d’auteur, which views the created symbol as a 
part of the owner’s personhood; the law seeks to prevent the abuse or misuse 
                                                                                                                           
stock [https://perma.cc/ET2W-DYT4] (last visited Apr. 9, 2016); Claire Suddath, A Brief History of 
Mickey Mouse, TIME (Nov. 18, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/arts/article/0,8599,1859935,00.
html [https://perma.cc/Z8P9-JLKY]; Ulster, supra note 1. 
 3 See Liu, supra note 2, at 1408. 
 4 See id. at 1396–97. 
 5 See Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 304(b) (2012) (pertaining to copyrights 
in their renewal term as of October 27, 1998). 
 6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 7 See ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 
5 (6th ed. 2012); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary 
France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 991 (1990); Chidi Oguamanam, Beyond Theories: Intel-
lectual Property Dynamics in the Global Knowledge Economy, 9 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 
104, 108–09 (2009). 
 8 See Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism, Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1997); William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLIT-
ICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 168 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Oguamanam, supra note 7, at 
108–09; Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors’ Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of 
French and American Law Compared, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 551 (2006) (quoting Rus-
sell J. DaSilva, Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists’ Rights in France 
and the United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 1, 3 (1980)). 
 9 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 985–89; Liu, supra note 2, at 1427–28. 
 10 See Liu, supra note 2, at 1428. 
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of the symbol in a way that could be attributed inappropriately back to the 
owner.11  
When a creation has a dual status, an interesting conflict between copy-
right and trademark law arises.12 Although Mickey Mouse originated as a cop-
yright, both his name and his image grew to be a very prominent trademarked 
symbol of TWDC.13 In theory, when he enters the public domain, Mickey 
Mouse still will be registered as a trademark to TWDC, yet the public may 
have free reign in how it uses his image in its creations—potentially damaging 
the family-friendly reputation of TWDC.14 
Should Mickey be given special copyright protection similar to that of 
droit d’auteur? Does the overlap between copyright and trademark cover the 
conflict between the international theories? This Note attempts to address these 
issues in three parts. Part I provides a background of the dominant theories of 
intellectual property law in both the United States and continental Europe. It 
also provides a brief history of Mickey Mouse’s origin. Part II compares U.S. 
copyright law to droit d’auteur. Additionally, it discusses the differences and 
overlap between U.S. copyright and trademark laws and their effects on the 
dual symbol and character of Mickey Mouse. Part III recommends that the 
U.S. intellectual property system view Mickey Mouse’s unique position 
through the lens of trademark law, allowing the moral rights and personhood of 
TWDC to be protected in a manner similar to the rights afforded under droit 
d’auteur. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Protection for tangible property is more easily conceptualized and ration-
alized than protection of intangible intellectual property.15 One of the primary 
reasons for an owner to protect his or her physical property is to preserve the 
property’s value.16 Intellectual property differs because the value of intangible 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Cotter, supra note 8, at 7, 12; Fisher, supra note 8, at 168; Oguamanam, supra note 7, at 
108–09. 
 12 See Kathryn M. Foley, Note, Protecting Fictional Characters: Defining the Elusive Trade-
mark-Copyright Divide, 41 CONN. L. REV. 921, 954–55 (2009); Liu, supra note 2, at 1427–28. 
13 See Liu, supra note 2, at 1427; Trademark Electronic Search System, U.S. PAT. & TRADE-
MARK OFF., http://tess2.uspto.gov/ [https://perma.cc/ZE3R-AUPC] (select “Word and/or Design Mark 
Search (Free Form),” search the term “(03.09.06)[DD] and (Live)[LD] and (Disney)[ALL]”) [herein-
after TESS]; TMVIEW, https://www.tmdn.org/tmview/welcome.html [https://perma.cc/2P8Q-53FY] 
(search “Mickey Mouse”) (showing various international registrations of Mickey Mouse); see also 
Keith Gluck, The Birth of a Mouse, THE WALT DISNEY FAMILY MUSEUM (Nov. 18, 2012), http://
www.waltdisney.org/blog/birth-mouse [https://perma.cc/38NF-RPR6]; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, 
supra note 1. 
 14 See Cotter, supra note 8, at 7; Liu, supra note 2, at 1427–28. 
 15 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 5. 
 16 See id. 
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ideas is not so easily diminished.17 Multiple people in different places can use 
and enjoy the knowledge conveyed through intellectual property without de-
creasing its value.18 Thus, the protection of such useful ideas cannot be vindi-
cated using the same economic reasons that a physical property owner would 
use.19 Instead, multiple theories have been developed to justify protecting intel-
lectual property.20 
A. The American Way 
The most prominent theory justifying the protection of intellectual prop-
erty in the United States is the utilitarian, or economic incentive, theory.21 The 
U.S. Constitution, as well as judicial decisions interpreting sources of intellec-
tual property law, has primarily used the utilitarian theory to justify U.S. intel-
lectual property laws.22 The utilitarian theory suggests that the best way to 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,” the goal outlined in the 
Constitution’s Copyright Clause, is to grant a creator an exclusive right to his 
works for a limited time.23 Without some form of an incentive to create, the 
theory reasons that creativity and inventiveness would slow, if not stop alto-
gether.24 For example, a person could appropriate a competitor’s information 
and disseminate it before the competitor is able to recoup their investment 
costs.25 The economic incentive theory prevents this, allowing the creator to 
recover his or her costs and encouraging the creator to continue to innovate 
and create.26 
Though it is widely accepted, the utilitarian theory also poses problems.27 
First, an incentive system promotes secrecy and exclusion in the name of inno-
vation.28 Critics of the utilitarian theory argue that allowing a creator to possess 
the exclusive right to his or her expression of an original idea grants the creator 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See id. 
18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See id. at 11; Fisher, supra note 8, at 168. 
 22 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries . . . .”); see MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 11; Fisher, supra note 8, at 168. 
 23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 11–12. 
 24 See Oguamanam, supra note 7, at 118–19. 
 25 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 12–14. Imagine that a playwright creates a play that 
speaks to a generation. See id. at 12–13. After the opening night, someone records it and posts it on 
YouTube for the entire world to see. See id. Because it is now available for free, it is very unlikely 
that the playwright will be able to recover the costs of creating and staging the play. See id. In theory, 
the playwright as well as others would leave the market and cause an underproduction of creative 
works. See id. 
 26 See id. at 12. 
 27 See id. at 14–16; Oguamanam, supra note 7, at 118–28. 
 28 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 14–16; Oguamanam, supra note 7, at 121. 
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a monopoly in an economic market.29 U.S. law, however, offsets these costs by 
limiting the duration and extent of an owner’s exclusive rights.30 
Critics also point out that many civilizations have enjoyed creativity and 
innovation without a conventional intellectual property system.31 This is evi-
dent from the fact that many meaningful works are published through forms of 
public subsidy and do not provide the creator with much economic reward.32 
Thus, the theory’s assumed link between creativity and economic incentive 
may not be particularly strong.33 
B. The French Droit Moral 
In contrast to the U.S. economic incentive theory, continental Europe uses 
noneconomic theories to justify its intellectual property laws.34 The French 
system is called droit d’auteur, or “author’s rights.”35 Droit d’auteur “is a con-
cept far broader than American copyright . . . . French law purports to protect 
the author’s intellectual and moral interests” in addition to his or her economic 
interests.36 Thus, the French include the idea of droit moral, or “moral rights,” 
in their laws, a concept that was eventually adopted by the rest of continental 
Europe and is still a dominant theory of European intellectual property rights 
today.37 
One of the contributing theories to droit moral is the natural law of prop-
erty, or the labor-desert theory.38 John Locke reasoned that individuals owned 
the “fruits of their labor” because they owned their own bodies.39 Following 
this concept, it seems logical that a creator would own the expression of ideas 
from his or her own mind.40 This theory was so compelling that remnants of it 
                                                                                                                           
 29 MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 14 (explaining that monopolistic behavior is one of the many 
dangerous economic practices from which American antitrust laws protect consumers). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Oguamanam, supra note 7, at 119 (pointing to Imperial China and the Arab world among oth-
ers). 
 32 Id. at 120–21. “For instance, many authoritative university publishers operate on one form of 
subsidy or another. Academic writings that make significant contributions to knowledge and innova-
tion hardly earn any viable royalties.” Id. at 120 n.62. 
 33 Id. at 118 (quoting IKECHI MGBEOJI, GLOBAL BIOPIRACY: PATENTS, PLANTS, AND INDIGE-
NOUS KNOWLEDGE 21 (2006)). 
 34 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 5; Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 991; Oguamanam, supra 
note 7, at 108–09. 
 35 See Piotraut, supra note 8, at 551. 
 36 Id. (quoting DaSilva, supra note 8, at 3). 
 37 Cotter, supra note 8, at 5; see also Fisher, supra note 8, at 168. 
 38 See Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 517, 523 (1990). 
 39 JOHN LOCKE, Concerning the True and Original Extent and End of Civil Government, in TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (1689). 
 40 Yen, supra note 38, at 537. Robert Merges believes that the labor theory does work well for 
intellectual property law: “The creator of a new work claims property not by virtue of contributing 
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are still found in U.S. intellectual property law.41 For example, academic pa-
pers are still protected under U.S. copyright laws even though there is not nec-
essarily an economic incentive to create the work.42 Using natural law as a jus-
tification for intellectual property protection becomes problematic, however, 
when determining how far a creator’s rights extend—perhaps one reason why 
it has fallen out of favor in U.S. jurisprudence.43 
The more dominant rationale for droit moral, however, finds its founda-
tion in Kantian and Hegelian philosophy.44 These concepts—termed the “per-
sonality theory” of intellectual property—give a creator a unique bundle of 
rights on the basis that his or her creation is a manifestation of his or her own 
personality.45 These moral rights can be boiled down to four key aspects:  
the droit de divulgation, or right of disclosure; the droit de repentir 
ou de retrait, or right to correct or withdraw works previously dis-
closed to the public; the droit de paternité, or right of attribution; 
and the droit au respect de l’œuvre, literally “the right to respect of 
the work,” usually translated as the right of integrity.46 
Of the four, the rights of attribution and integrity are deemed the most 
important and are expressly imprescriptible, meaning they cannot expire 
through the passage of time or non-use.47 The right of attribution concerns 
whether a work is misattributed, is not credited at all, or is attributed anony-
mously or pseudonymously.48 In essence, the creator has a right to either be 
associated or disconnected from his or her work at his or her own will.49 The 
right of integrity, in its simplest terms, is the protection given to a creator’s 
work so that misuse or abuse of the work by others does not harm the creator’s 
reputation.50 The right, however, can be so expansive as to include any misrep-
                                                                                                                           
some new thing to a preexisting thing, but to the transformation of the preexisting thing by the ex-
penditure of labor.” ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 15 (2011). 
 41 See Yen, supra note 38, at 531. 
 42 Id. at 537. Yen also gives other copyrightable examples of “the results of accidents and prod-
ucts which the government requires public utilities to print.” Id. 
 43 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 4. 
 44 Cotter, supra note 8, at 7; Fisher, supra note 8, at 168. 
 45 See Cotter, supra note 8, at 7; Fisher, supra note 8, at 168; Oguamanam, supra note 7, at 108–
09. 
 46 Cotter, supra note 8, at 10–11 (emphasis added). 
 47 Id. at 12; see ELIZABETH ADENEY, THE MORAL RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND PERFORMERS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 169 (2006); Lior Zemer, Moral Rights: Limited Edi-
tion, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1519, 1524 (2011). 
 48 Cotter, supra note 8, at 12; see ADENEY, supra note 47, at 179–80. 
 49 See ADENEY, supra note 47, at 179–80; Cotter, supra note 8, at 12. 
 50 Cotter, supra note 8, at 13; see ADENEY, supra note 47, at 181–83. 
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resentation that contradicts the creator’s “intellectual interests, personal style, 
or literary, artistic[,] or scientific conceptions.”51 
Opponents to the personhood theories argue that a work is not a product 
of the creator’s personality, but rather a product of the society in which the 
creator lives.52 Additionally, it is unclear whether or how a creator’s investment 
in his or her work can be measured or considered.53 Should a project into 
which the creator put numerous years of work and effort receive more protec-
tion than an accidental discovery?54 Finally, others question how consumers’ 
rights and personalities are recognized through this theory.55 
C. It All Started with a Rabbit? 
As some are surprised to discover, Mickey Mouse was not Walt Disney’s 
first original creation; Walt Disney’s story actually begins with Oswald the 
Lucky Rabbit.56 In 1927, Universal Pictures contracted Disney and his team to 
produce twenty-six original cartoons featuring Disney’s original character, 
Oswald the Lucky Rabbit.57 The Oswald cartoons were a great success.58 When 
Disney went to renegotiate his contract the following year, Universal Pictures 
demanded he take a pay cut.59 Upon his refusal, Universal revealed that it 
owned the copyright to Oswald and had secretly contracted most of Disney’s 
animation team to work exclusively for it.60 In a desperate attempt to save the 
Disney Brothers Studio, during his train ride back to California Disney created 
the initial sketch of Mortimer Mouse.61 At his wife’s insistence, Disney 
changed the name from Mortimer to Mickey, and the legend was born.62 On 
November 18, 1928, “Steamboat Willie,” featuring Mickey Mouse, was re-
leased as the first animation to include synchronized music and sound effects.63 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Cotter, supra note 8, at 13 (quoting Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright Alienability Re-
strictions and the Enhancement of Author Autonomy: A Normative Evaluation, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 347, 
387 (1993)); see ADENEY, supra note 47, at 181–83. 
 52 MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 10. 
 53 Id. at 9. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. at 10. 
 56 See Oswald, BBC, supra note 2; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra note 1. 
 57 See Oswald, BBC, supra note 2; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra note 1. 
 58 See Gluck, supra note 13; Oswald, BBC, supra note 2. 
 59 See Oswald, BBC, supra note 2; Suddath, supra note 2. 
 60 See Gluck, supra note 13; Oswald, BBC, supra note 2; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra 
note 1. 
 61 See Gluck, supra note 13; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra note 1. 
 62 See Gluck, supra note 13; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra note 1. 
 63 See Gluck, supra note 13; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra note 1. 
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Since then, Mickey has evolved in style and has risen to be one of the most 
famous mascots in the world.64 
II. DISCUSSION 
In the United States, Mickey is subject to both copyright and trademark 
laws.65 The overlap between the two areas could help determine the fate of 
Mickey Mouse once he enters the public domain in 2024.66 Additionally, eval-
uating the way works are treated in France demonstrates that the areas of over-
lap between trademark and copyright are fertile ground for continued protec-
tion of one of the world’s most famous characters.67 
A. Copyright vs. Trademark 
Like many other fictional characters, Mickey Mouse is subject to both 
copyright and trademark laws.68 When a creation is copyrighted, the author has 
a monopoly on its use for a limited time.69 On the other hand, trademark law 
allows the owner to use his monopoly rights perpetually in order to avoid con-
sumer confusion.70 A conflict between these two areas of intellectual property 
law arises when a copyrighted work enters the public domain yet is still pro-
tected under trademark law.71 
1. Copyright Law 
Copyright laws in the United States allow the author to protect his “origi-
nal work[] of authorship” so long as it is “fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression.”72 Under copyright protection, the author has the exclusive right to 
use or license a variety of rights.73 For example, he or she may reproduce the 
                                                                                                                           
 64 See Gluck, supra note 13; Marketing Evolution of Mickey Mouse and Disney, OSTER & ASSO-
CIATES (July 17, 2014), http://osterads.com/post/the-marketing-evolution-of-mickey-mouse-and-
disney/143 [https://perma.cc/REE5-Y3SL] [hereinafter Marketing Evolution]; Mickey, The Universal 
Icon, PEOPALOVE BRANDTALK, http://www.peopalove.com/brandtalk/2010/dec/wanted.html [https://
perma.cc/LH9Z-LY8D]; Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra note 1. 
 65 See Liu, supra note 2, at 1428. 
 66 See id. 
 67 See SILKE VON LEWINSKI, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW AND POLICY 45–46 (2008); 
Foley, supra note 12, at 960–61; Michael Todd Helfand, Note, When Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as 
Superman: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Pictorial 
Characters, 44 STAN. L. REV. 623, 627 (1992); Liu, supra note 2, at 1428, 1430, 1433; Piotraut, supra 
note 8, at 558, 565, 567–69. 
 68 See Liu, supra note 2, at 1428. 
 69 See Christine Nickles, The Conflicts Between Intellectual Property Protections When a Char-
acter Enters the Public Domain, 7 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 133, 134 (1999). 
 70 See Foley, supra note 12, at 940; Nickles, supra note 69, at 134, 158. 
 71 See Liu, supra note 2, at 1424, 1428; Nickles, supra note 69, at 134. 
 72 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012). 
 73 Id. § 106. 
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work, sell the reproduction, or perform and display the work publicly.74 Addi-
tionally, he or she can create derivative works based on the original work.75 
Thus, TWDC is the only entity that can use Mickey Mouse in order to create 
new derivative works based on the original “Steamboat Willie.”76 
These protections and rights, however, are not perpetual; the U.S. Consti-
tution specifically provides that protection lasts only for “limited Times.”77 
Congress has changed its interpretation of this constitutional language over the 
past century.78 Mickey Mouse was originally protected under the Copyright 
Act of 1909 and consequently, had an original copyright duration of twenty-
eight years plus a twenty-eight year renewal.79 After the 1976 Copyright Act 
took effect, all surviving copyrights from the 1909 Act had their renewal peri-
od extended to forty-seven years.80 Accordingly, under the 1976 legislation, 
Mickey Mouse was scheduled to enter the public domain in 2004.81 In 1998, 
extensive lobbying by TWDC and many other expiring copyright owners led 
to the Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA).82 The CTEA extended the life 
of all existing copyrights by twenty years.83 
The extension of copyright durations has caused considerable backlash 
from proponents of the public domain.84 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the constitution-
ality of the CTEA was challenged.85 The petitioners did not object to the new 
term limit set by the CTEA; instead, they questioned the constitutionality of 
the extension of the existing copyright durations.86 They argued that Congress 
violated the First Amendment and the “limited Times” portion of the Copyright 
Clause by extending the duration of existing copyrights.87 The Supreme Court, 
however, determined that Congress did not exceed its constitutional limita-
                                                                                                                           
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 See id. 
 77 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 78 See 17 U.S.C. § 301; MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 530. 
 79 See MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 526–27; Gluck, supra note 13; Suddath, supra note 2; 
Ulster, supra note 1. 
 80 MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 527; Arlen W. Langvardt & Kyle T. Langvardt, Unwise or 
Unconstitutional?: The Copyright Term Extension Act, the Eldred Decision, and the Freezing of the 
Public Domain for Private Benefit, 5 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 193, 200 (2004). 
 81 MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 527; Liu, supra note 2, at 1408; see Gluck, supra note 13; 
Suddath, supra note 2; Ulster, supra note 1. 
 82 MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 527; Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 80, at 237–38; Liu, 
supra note 2, at 1425–26. 
 83 17 U.S.C. § 304(b); MERGES ET AL., supra note 7, at 527. 
 84 See generally Langvardt & Langvardt, supra note 80 (calling the constitutionality and necessity 
of the CTEA into question); Liu, supra note 2 (pointing to critiques regarding the CTEA’s constitu-
tionality and effect on the U.S. economic incentive theory-based system). 
 85 537 U.S. 186, 193 (2003). 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. at 193–94. 
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tions.88 In fact, the Court stated that one of Congress’s key reasons for adopt-
ing the extension was a European Union Directive, which extended European 
copyright durations and would deny reciprocity to non-EU countries with 
shorter durations.89 Therefore, Congress was ensuring that U.S. authors would 
receive the same protection for their works in other countries and was incentiv-
izing foreign authors to distribute their works in the United States.90 Further, 
Congress’s decision was not unprecedented: the 1976 Copyright Act was en-
acted in response to the discrepancies between the 1909 Act and the Berne 
Convention.91 Because the Court found that Congress had a rational basis for 
its legislation, it did not find a violation of the Copyright Clause.92 Additional-
ly, the Court found that the close temporal proximity of the adoption of the 
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment demonstrated that “copyright’s 
limited monopolies are compatible with free speech principles.”93 Moreover, 
the Court pointed out, copyright law has built-in limitations and safeguards 
against abuse to protect First Amendment rights.94 Thus, the CTEA and its ex-
tension of the previously existing copyrights were deemed constitutional.95 
As the Eldred Court’s discussion emphasizes, duration is not the only lim-
itation on copyright protection.96 For example, copyright protection does not 
“extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, 
principle, or discovery.”97 Thus, “Steamboat Willie,” the cartoon in which 
Mickey Mouse debuted, is protectable by copyright, but the idea of an animat-
ed cartoon with synchronized sound featuring an animal character could be 
used by anyone.98 Additionally, there are numerous defenses available against 
copyright violations, such as the fair-use doctrine.99 The fair-use doctrine per-
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 91 Id. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works sets the minimum 
requirements of international copyright protection. See generally Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinaf-
ter Berne Convention]. Authors of signatory states receive reciprocal treatment in each member na-
tion. See id. The United States did not become a party to the Berne Convention until 1989. See Berne 
Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988); MERGES ET 
AL., supra note 7, at 743. 
 92 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 205–06. 
 93 Id. at 219. 
 94 Id. at 219–20. 
 95 Id. at 221–22. 
 96 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102(b), 107; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–20. 
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mits the use of a copied work that would otherwise infringe on the copyright 
when the work is used “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news report-
ing, teaching[,] . . . scholarship, or research.”100 
2. Trademark Law 
Trademark law similarly allows the owner a monopoly on “any word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof.”101 A character, such as 
Mickey Mouse, would often fall under the “combination” category because he 
consists of both a name and a symbol.102 This monopoly allows the owner to 
use the character in conjunction with particular goods so long as the trademark 
is registered.103 Similar to derivative works in copyright, trademark also allows 
for a zone of expansion.104 If the expanded goods are sufficiently related to the 
registered goods, the trademark is still valid and will cover the expanded goods 
as well.105 Unlike copyrights, however, trademarks must be registered in order 
to receive full legal protection under the Lanham Act.106 
Trademark also differs from copyright in that it can potentially have a 
perpetual duration.107 The purpose of a trademark is to prevent consumer con-
fusion.108 Consumers begin to affiliate a trademark with a particular level of 
quality, allowing the owner to develop goodwill.109 If another entity begins 
using the trademark on a product that does not meet consumer expectations, 
the owner’s goodwill and reputation could be damaged.110 In a sense, the 
trademark becomes entwined with the identity of the owner in the eyes of the 
consumer.111 Thus, a trademark is protected so long as the trademark is used in 
commerce to distinguish a product and identify its source.112 
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 101 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012); see Nickles, supra note 69, at 156. 
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Like copyrights, trademarks are restrained by limitations and defenses.113 
Under the Lanham Act, which provides full legal protection of registered 
trademarks, the trademark cannot be protected if it has been abandoned.114 
Abandonment occurs when either the owner stops using the symbol without 
demonstrated intent to reuse it or the trademark has become associated as the 
generic term for a product.115 In both of these situations, the consumer no 
longer affiliates the trademark with the owner, and another’s use of the trade-
mark would not damage the owner’s goodwill.116 Additionally, if a third party 
can prove that use of a trademark would not cause consumer confusion, no 
trademark violation will be found.117 
3. The Intersection of Copyright and Trademark Law 
Even though a copyright may protect a particular character, trademark 
law simultaneously may limit some fair-use defenses to the copyright protec-
tion on that character.118 Once the copyrighted character enters the public do-
main, however, even more significant overlap may cause problems for those 
who try to use the character.119 In theory, the two areas of law are distinct, but 
in practice, the line is not so clear.120 The muddling of the line between copy-
right and trademark law primarily occurs in three types of claims: confusion 
claims, merchandising claims, and dilution claims.121 
First, confusion claims arise naturally in trademark infringement cases.122 
Trademark owners claim that consumers have come to identify the formerly 
copyrighted work closely with the owner’s identity.123 The case law in this area 
provides no clear answer as to where trademark protection ends and the public 
domain begins.124 In certain situations, the courts have tried to slow the ex-
panding territory of copyright.125 Yet, other cases have acknowledged that 
some characters have “‘universal recognition,’ ‘widespread popularity,’ and 
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‘extensive goodwill.’”126 Based on recent trends, it is likely that the courts will 
hesitate to allow trademark law to dictate how a traditionally copyrightable 
creation can or cannot be used.127 
Another area lacking clarity is merchandising claims.128 Owners com-
monly place copyrighted or trademarked images on merchandise unrelated to 
the image.129 For example, one can purchase a Mickey Mouse watch, mug, or 
t-shirt at a variety of locations.130 Again, courts cannot seem to agree on how to 
treat this merchandise.131 In Fleischer Studios v. A.V.E.L.A., the Ninth Circuit 
originally determined that consumers purchased clothing with the character of 
Betty Boop due to the image, not due to the clothing’s source.132 Thus, the 
merchandise was outside the protection of trademark law.133 The relevant por-
tion of the holding, however, was vacated and superseded by the same Ninth 
Circuit.134 On the other hand, some courts recognize that if the character is still 
functioning as a trademark, it will be protectable.135 Still other courts have tak-
en an even broader approach, stating, “It matters not why the public associates 
the presence of a character on merchandise with sponsorship or licensing of 
the merchandise, but only that the public does in fact make this association.”136 
Dilution claims are another source of tension between copyright and 
trademark law.137 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 created a 
“cause of action to protect famous marks from unauthorized users that attempt 
to trade upon the goodwill and established renown of such marks and, thereby, 
dilute their distinctive quality.”138 Therefore, an owner of a famous mark could 
claim that an unauthorized use blurs or tarnishes its goodwill, even if that mark 
has entered the public domain of copyright.139 Blurring occurs when the dis-
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tinctive nature of the trademark has been diminished.140 For example, selling 
furniture under the name “Mickey Mouse’s Home Furnishings” would dilute 
the name of Mickey Mouse, even though consumers may realize that it is not 
furniture made by TWDC.141 Additionally, tarnishment—the other form of di-
lution—harms the reputation of the trademark.142 Thus, opening a strip club 
called “Mickey Mouse’s Stripper House” would damage the wholesome, fami-
ly-friendly image of Mickey that consumers have.143 When copyrighted works 
begin to enter the public domain once again, dilution claims will likely be an 
important instrument for owners to continue protecting their rights.144 Some, 
however, argue that such broad protections could severely limit copyright 
law’s intention of having a robust public domain.145 
B. Copyright vs. Droit d’auteur 
Despite developing disparate copyright laws, the U.S. and French copy-
right systems started similarly.146 In comparing the original theories of protec-
tion, both systems wanted to promote the dissemination of knowledge as well 
as reward an author for his or her labor.147 Additionally, both systems required 
formalities and extended protection to works that advanced public instruc-
tion.148 Notwithstanding these initial similarities, the two systems diverged and 
now enshrine very different ideals.149 
As even their names suggest, U.S. copyright and French droit d’auteur em-
phasize the rights of different parties in an ownership and use dispute.150 Droit 
d’auteur literally translates into “author’s rights,” and—not surprisingly—the 
French laws use terminology that focuses on the author and his rights.151 On the 
other hand, the U.S. laws focus on the user of a work and which of the user’s 
acts are permissible.152 Even the introductions to each country’s respective copy-
right act accentuate the differing points of view: France’s law names the author 
first while the United States’ act begins by defining the term “copyright.”153 
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In analyzing the laws, it becomes clear that France offers protection to a 
wider variety of works.154 U.S. copyright law protects “original works of au-
thorship” so long as they are “fixed in a tangible medium.”155 French law lacks 
this fixation requirement.156 Instead, droit d’auteur extends protection to 
“works of the mind whatever may be the kind, form of expression, merit, or 
destination.”157 Thus, improvised expression, such as live performances, can be 
protected without a form of recording to fix the work.158 Additionally, droit 
d’auteur protects works that U.S. copyright law does not, such as typeface, 
industrial design, and titles of work.159 
The actual owner of the rights differs in both countries as well.160 In 
France, the author—defined as having “personally created the work”—owns 
all rights to the work.161 Thus, the author must be a natural person and cannot 
be a legal entity.162 Because the author is the sole owner of the creation, work 
made while the author is employed by a company or legal entity still belongs 
to the author.163 U.S. copyright law differs significantly.164 The author typically 
is defined as “he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker . . . ,”165 
but the actual author may not be the owner of the copyright.166 If the work was 
created for hire, the “employer or other person for whom the work was pre-
pared is considered the author.”167 Thus, a talented animator could lose his or 
her original creation to his or her employer.168 
A final major difference between copyright and droit d’auteur is the dura-
tion of the protection.169 As previously discussed, copyright law is restricted to 
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“limited Times.”170 Currently, the duration of a copyright for works created 
after 1978 is the life of the author plus seventy years.171 For works in their re-
newal period as of 1978, the term changed to ninety-five years from the date of 
the original copyright.172 Thus, the copyright system embodies the notion that 
an author should not receive protection longer than necessary to incentivize 
creation in order to benefit the public.173 In stark contrast, droit moral of droit 
d’auteur is perpetual.174 The French statute states, “The author has the right to 
respect of his name, his authorship[,] and his work. The right is attached to his 
person. It is perpetual, inalienable[,] and imprescriptible. It is transferable upon 
death to the author’s heirs. Exercise can be given to a third party through 
wills.”175 Droit d’auteur emphasizes that the work is a part of the author’s per-
son; therefore, it cannot be removed from his or her identity.176 Even at death, 
the author can decide who will maintain his or her right in order to protect the 
part of his or her person that is left on this earth.177 
Despite the plethora of fundamental differences, both copyright and droit 
d’auteur have numerous practical similarities.178 For example, both France and 
the United States recognize the work of co-authors; France refers to it as a 
work of collaboration while the United States calls it a joint work.179 Neither 
France nor the United States requires formalities, like registration of the work, 
in order for the author to receive protection.180 Once protection has been ex-
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tended, the author receives almost identical exploitation rights, even though 
the rights are defined differently.181 Moreover, both countries’ courts use a sub-
stantial similarity test to determine whether those rights have been violated.182 
If the author’s rights have been disturbed, offenders face similar forms of lia-
bility or punishment.183 Additionally, both countries evoke a fair-use doctrine, 
which allows a third party to use the work without the author’s permission so 
long as it is used in a prescribed manner.184 
Finally, neither country requires proof of artistic merit in order to extend 
protection to a work.185 Instead, courts will look at whether the work was suffi-
ciently original before extending protection.186 In the United States, the bar is 
set very low when determining whether a work is original.187 In Feist Publica-
tions v. Rural Telephone Service, the U.S. Supreme Court established that only 
a “modicum of creativity” is required to find that a work is original.188 French 
law also vaguely defines originality as “a print of the author’s personality.”189 
In practice, French courts will usually apply the Feist test, resulting in similar 
decisions of protectable copyright in both countries.190 
III. ANALYSIS 
The clock is ticking to find an appropriate treatment of Mickey Mouse so 
that Mickey’s renowned name and symbol can receive continued protection.191 
If another extension is not passed, Mickey will enter the public domain at the 
start of 2024.192 In order to offset the potential repercussions of entering the 
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public domain, copyright and trademark laws should be reconciled to extend 
protection to Mickey Mouse and other similarly situated characters.193  
A. Mickey and U.S. Trademark 
As previously mentioned, the name Mickey Mouse and a variety of his 
images are registered trademarks in the United States and the rest of the world; 
his character is also subject to copyright protection.194 Under both areas of law, 
TWDC receives various protections against others damaging its reputation by 
unauthorized use of Mickey Mouse.195 When Mickey enters the public domain, 
however, it is unclear whether the general use of public domain characters will 
trump the perpetual protections of trademark laws.196 Despite the arguments of 
public domain advocates, the continued protection of the trademark laws 
should supersede copyright law’s public domain because Mickey Mouse has 
become synonymous with TWDC.197 
For the past eighty-six years, TWDC has supplied the public with Mickey 
Mouse cartoons.198 He was featured in a vast majority of Disney’s original an-
imated shorts until the mid-1940s.199 Even after TWDC began to broaden its 
character and story repertoire, Mickey still remained an important and iconic 
character—making cameos in Disney films and television shows to this day.200 
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More recently, he has been featured in his own line of video games, a re-
vamped television show, and even a new animated short that was featured be-
fore screenings of the 2013 film Frozen.201 As a result, consumers identify 
TWDC as the source of on-screen appearances of Mickey Mouse.202 
In addition to creative works, Mickey is featured on a wide variety of 
merchandise.203 TWDC has operated versions of its current business segment, 
Disney Consumer Products (DCP), since Walt Disney first licensed Mickey 
Mouse’s image in 1929.204 Now, DCP oversees three branches: Disney Licens-
ing, Disney Publishing Worldwide, and Disney Store.205 Therefore, TWDC is 
able to ensure that all merchandise available to consumers meets its approval 
and does not damage the consumer goodwill that it has developed over the past 
eighty-six years.206 
Finally, Mickey is the mascot of the Disney theme parks all over the 
world.207 His presence is found throughout the parks, whether it be in one of 
the numerous parades, stage shows, or meet-and-greets.208 Mickey is also the 
first costumed character to receive aesthetic, practical, and technical updates in 
the parks.209 For example, TWDC unveiled an interactive meet-and-greet 
where guests can actually converse with Magician Mickey.210 He sings “Happy 
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Birthday,” tells jokes, and even performs magic tricks at the guests’ requests.211 
TWDC’s tendency to invest in Mickey demonstrates the importance that the 
company places on Mickey’s representation of the Disney brand.212 
As mentioned in Part II.A, the primary purpose of trademark law is to 
prevent consumer confusion.213 It has been well established that, in trademark 
law, confusion refers to consumer confusion as to the source of whatever 
goods or products brandish the trademark.214 In this particular situation, the 
prevailing presence of Mickey Mouse throughout all of TWDC’s business 
segments demonstrates that consumers are likely to perceive TWDC as the 
source of Mickey.215 Thus, if an author were to create a new work featuring 
Mickey Mouse, whether it be a new animation or a t-shirt, a consumer would 
likely believe that TWDC created or authorized the work.216 
The consequences of consumer confusion could be very troublesome for 
TWDC.217 The company prides itself on creating and maintaining an interna-
tional, family-friendly reputation.218 But, once Mickey enters the public do-
main, an author could create a racially insensitive or even a pornographic 
Mickey Mouse cartoon.219 Currently, the U.S. Supreme Court leans toward 
honoring public domain users’ rights over the trademark owners’ rights when it 
comes to determining which intellectual property law should be the primary 
protection of the work.220 Therefore, this unauthorized cartoon probably would 
be legal, but the likelihood of consumers still associating it with Disney—even 
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though they may not believe that Disney authorized its publication—is high.221 
As a result, consumer goodwill for TWDC and all of its business segments 
would be damaged.222 
Some may argue that this is the most appropriate response in order to 
keep TWDC in check and prevent it from becoming too powerful.223 Critics of 
TWDC point to its purported promotion of negative ideals, such as false repre-
sentations of love or race.224 Others claim that TWDC is too big and too far-
reaching.225 Still others declare TWDC uses its dominance for questionable 
business practices, such as “pric[ing] middle-class families out.”226 The more 
farfetched conspiracies claim that TWDC promotes Satanism and the occult.227  
Although it is true that TWDC is a very influential company,228 these crit-
ics appear to neglect many of the company’s positive contributions.229 For ex-
ample, the presence of a TWDC theme park significantly improves the local 
economy of wherever it is located.230 An independent study in 2013 reported 
that the Disneyland Resort contributed $5.7 billion annually to southern Cali-
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fornia’s economy, in addition to 28,000 regional jobs.231 This 2013 study re-
ports a 21% increase from a previous 2009 study, which showed an economic 
impact of $4.7 billion and 21,000 jobs.232 The impacts are even more signifi-
cant in Florida, with Walt Disney World generating approximately $18.2 bil-
lion annually as of 2009.233 The economic benefits also stretch beyond the 
United States.234 The most visited theme park in Europe, Disneyland Paris, 
contributed a total of €50 billion to the French economy as of 2012 and “6.2% 
of foreign exchange income generated by tourism in France has been provided 
by travellers whose primary reason for coming to the country was to visit” 
Disneyland Paris.235 In fiscal year 2014, Hong Kong Disneyland employed 
approximately 5100 full-time and 2700 part-time employees and contributed 
about HK$13.2 billion in economic impact.236 
In addition, TWDC does its best to contribute more than just money to 
society.237 TWDC has numerous initiatives to promote corporate citizenship 
across all of its business segments, which range from encouraging physical 
activity and healthy habits through its media outlets to helping children and 
families in need.238 In May 2013, TWDC’s program VoluntEARS celebrated 
thirty years of service, recording over 7.5 million volunteer hours in over forty 
countries.239 
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Moreover, Disney’s films do promote positive lessons, despite the criti-
cism the company receives regarding some of its more dated themes.240 The 
2013 animated film Frozen demonstrated that Disney is breaking the stereotyp-
ical fairytale plot by bringing its films more in line with modern ideals through 
its inclusion of strong female protagonists and more realistic depictions of love 
and sacrifice.241 
But if Disney is such a successful and diversified company, why should 
anyone care if it loses the right to protect Mickey Mouse? The same mouse 
that built Disney could also spell its decline.242 Public domain use of Mickey 
could begin to chisel away at Disney’s family-friendly reputation and give crit-
ics and conspiracy theorists more ammunition to besmirch TWDC and its ac-
tivities.243 The possible ripple effect is logical: more impressionable consumers 
are likely to place less value on the Disney brand, which will slowly begin to 
impact negatively the economic contributions the company makes.244 Addi-
tionally, competitors could attempt to use Mickey to further imitate the success 
of TWDC.245 Imagine being able to meet Mickey Mouse at SeaWorld,246 or 
Universal’s Islands of Adventure transforming its Marvel-themed area to use 
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Disney’s expired copyrighted material.247 Increased competition typically ben-
efits consumers;248 however, a balance should be struck when the competition 
unfairly damages the image and reputation of one of the competing compa-
nies.249 
The conflicts between copyright and trademark law place TWDC in a 
unique position.250 Allowing the traditional uses of public domain material 
could negatively affect TWDC’s business operations and reputation.251 Accord-
ingly, trademark law should be used to determine the outcome when the two 
areas of law overlap.252 This would not prevent authors from creating new 
works with Mickey Mouse so long as it was made clear that TWDC was not 
the work’s source.253 Additionally, the traditional trademark defenses, such as 
parody and fair use, would still be applicable.254 Thus, public domain users 
would have reasonable access to the character of Mickey Mouse despite the 
trademark protections.255 
The strongest limitations to the public domain usage of Mickey Mouse 
are most likely to come from the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 
2006.256 As previously discussed, the Dilution Act prevents others from dilut-
ing a trademark through blurring or tarnishment.257 In order to receive protec-
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tion, a trademark must be famous, the violator must be making a commercial 
use of the mark, the violating use must have begun after the mark became fa-
mous, and the violator’s use must dilute the mark’s ability to distinguish goods 
or services.258 The key concern to bringing a dilution claim is the fame of the 
trademark.259 In the case of Mickey Mouse, he would meet the requisite level 
of recognition under the statute’s provisions.260 He is an internationally recog-
nized character and has had this reputation for decades.261 Therefore, in many 
situations, TWDC would be able to prevent Mickey Mouse from being used in 
a way that “impairs [his] distinctiveness” or that “harms [his] reputation” 
through the protections of the Dilution Act.262 Thus, TWDC would be able to 
stop others from flooding the market with unrelated Mickey Mouse-branded 
companies in addition to inhibiting uses that would damage Mickey’s family-
friendly repute.263 
B. The French Droit Moral to the Rescue 
Allowing trademark law to supersede the public domain is likely to re-
ceive much criticism.264 The ideas that flow from France’s droit d’auteur could 
provide comfort to those skeptics.265 As discussed in Part II, droit d’auteur 
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gives expansive rights to the author of a work, including some perpetual rights 
to the author’s creation.266 The personality theory supports the author’s rights 
based on the belief that the creation represents part of the author’s personali-
ty.267 The close association between Mickey Mouse and TWDC is also remi-
niscent of the personality theory.268 Mickey is so entangled with the identity of 
the TWDC that it is hard to rationalize a separation of the two.269 Consequent-
ly, droit d’auteur provides a justification for a trademark-favored interpretation 
of TWDC’s rights in Mickey Mouse.270 
Perhaps the most cohesive concepts from France and the United States are 
droit moral and the rights found in the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act of 2006.271 As discussed in Part I, droit moral consists of four key rights, 
but the two expressly imprescriptible ones are the right of attribution and the 
right of integrity.272 The right of attribution requires that the author be given 
credit for his work, even after exploitation rights have expired.273 This right is 
comparable to the importance of the source in trademark law.274 Furthermore, 
the right of integrity bares striking resemblance to the Dilution Act.275 When 
the right of integrity is translated literally from French, it means “the right to 
respect for his . . . work.”276 Typically, the right of integrity prevents modifica-
tions of the work and ensures protection for the author’s overall reputation.277 
Similarly, the Dilution Act precludes a trademark violator from tarnishing the 
reputation of the author.278 Thus, the parallels between droit moral and the Di-
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lution Act can provide a justification for a unique treatment of some copyright-
ed works.279 
When applying droit d’auteur to Mickey’s situation, however, a key prob-
lem arises: Mickey is owned by a corporation, not an individual.280 Unlike 
copyright law, droit d’auteur does not permit a corporation to be defined as an 
author because a corporation cannot create.281 In order to reconcile this differ-
ence, however, two different arguments can be made.282 First, one can argue 
that Walt Disney was the author of Mickey Mouse.283 Under droit d’auteur, an 
author can assign his or her rights to heirs or a third party upon death.284 Even 
though a corporation cannot create, it can still own the rights that have been 
assigned by the author;285 therefore, TWDC would have been able to receive 
the rights to protect Mickey at Walt Disney’s death.286 The second, and perhaps 
more straightforward, rationale is dependent on Mickey Mouse being a collec-
tive work.287 Under droit d’auteur, a collective work is defined as:  
[A] work created on the initiative of either a natural or legal person 
who edits, publishes[,] and divulges it under his/its own direction 
and own name. With this kind of work, the personal contributions of 
the participating authors merge to the point that it is not possible to 
attribute to each of them a distinct right in the composite work as a 
whole.288 
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Thus, if a company, such as TWDC, were to initiate and distribute the creation 
under its name, the company would receive the same rights as a natural-person 
author, including the rights prescribed under droit moral.289 Though TWDC 
was still Walt Disney Studio at the time, it initiated the creation of Mickey 
Mouse and his animated adventures and ultimately “peddled [the ‘Steamboat 
Willie’ cartoon itself] on the open market” instead of using a distributor.290 
Therefore, the initial issue of a company being the author of the work would be 
resolved.291 
 These justifications are not radically different from the ultimate treatment 
of corporations’ ownership rights in the United States.292 Copyright allows a 
corporation to be the author of a work created by an employee “within the 
scope of his or her employment.”293 In essence, a corporation can have very 
similar rights under both systems.294 Regardless, when marrying the two sys-
tems, it would follow that the corporation would be able to receive both the au-
thor’s exploitation and moral rights to the work based on the current U.S. works 
for hire law.295 Thus, TWDC could then have the same protections droit moral 
extends to the authors despite being a corporation.296 
Another dilemma that arises with the merging of droit d’auteur and the 
U.S. copyright system is the duration of the author’s various rights.297 Though 
the exploitation rights under droit d’auteur expire at the same time as the U.S. 
copyright duration,298 the rights of attribution and integrity found in droit mor-
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al are perpetual.299 The duration of these rights bears more resemblance to the 
duration of a trademark.300 In order to “Americanize” the duration of droit 
moral, a compromise could be struck, limiting the length of protection to ex-
tend so long as the copyright is active—similar to how a trademark can be pro-
tected so long as it is actively being used in commerce.301 Therefore, Disney’s 
moral rights in Mickey Mouse should only be protected so long as Mickey 
continues to be entwined in TWDC’s personality.302 
Thus, droit d’auteur—and more specifically, droit moral—provide the 
missing link between marrying U.S. copyright and trademark laws.303 When 
combined, these overlapping areas of law allow for a straightforward and co-
hesive way of extending protection to dual-status creations.304 When such a 
creation enters the public domain, trademark law should supersede based on a 
combination of personality theory and droit moral.305 Though this may limit 
some uses of the creation, the traditional trademark defenses still would ap-
ply.306 If a dual-status creation is famous, however, the Federal Trademark Di-
lution Revision Act of 2006 would amplify protection pursuant to the Act’s 
intent of protecting the goodwill generated by the creation.307 Similar to the 
right of integrity of droit moral, the Dilution Act would prevent uses that 
would harm the owner’s reputation.308 In this case, Mickey Mouse could con-
tinue to be protected from any uses that would damage TWDC’s goodwill and 
reputation while still being available for creative purposes in the public do-
main.309  
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CONCLUSION 
When a copyrighted work becomes established as a renowned trademark, 
it should not be treated the same as a normal work when it enters the public 
domain. Instead, trademark law should dictate the treatment of the formerly 
copyrighted work. This solution finds justification through the personality the-
ory and the French droit d’auteur. Personality theory states that an author im-
bues some of his or her own personality into the work, and therefore, the au-
thor inherently owns that expression of his or herself. Droit d’auteur codifies 
this theory with its droit moral. Through this right, an author enjoys the per-
petual protection of his or her work’s integrity, preventing others from using 
the creation in ways that could damage the author’s reputation. Additionally, 
numerous other countries have recognized moral rights, with most providing 
protection at least until the author’s copyright has expired. Similarly, U.S. 
trademark law provides protections to a famous mark in order to protect the 
owner’s reputation through the Federal Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 
2006. The resemblance of the protections demonstrates the feasibility of a par-
allel protection to be extended to a famous trademark-copyright hybrid. 
For TWDC, Mickey Mouse has become far more than a normal copy-
righted character. He is plastered all over its merchandise, its investor-relations 
materials, and its products and services. He represents the brand at various 
functions, including making appearances at shareholder meetings and volun-
teer events. The character of Mickey Mouse is synonymous with TWDC. Con-
sequently, he would be a prime example of a trademark-copyright hybrid that 
should fall into a specialized area of protection. By allowing this exception, the 
Walt Disney Company can continue to be the successful, family-oriented brand 
the world has come to expect. 
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